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1. INTRODUCTION
We investigate threats to user privacy due to inference by a search engine through users’ online be-
haviour. Of particular interest is learning related to potentially sensitive topics such as health, finance
and sexual orientation. Our goal is to inform the user by detecting evidence of privacy disclosure
through analysis of personalised content. Our method is readily implementable with available open
tools, simple to apply, and provides highly accurate results.
Our approach is borrowed from black-box testing: given a sequence of user queries we embed
a subsequence of probe queries and observe corresponding search engine responses. By analysing
changes in the responses to the probe queries over time, we hope to be able to spot learning of topics
the user considers sensitive and so would prefer not to disclose to the search engine.
Using Bing and Google Search, we demonstrate that by monitoring changes in the adverts dis-
played in the response to probe queries we are able to accurately detect evidence of learning for a
range of sensitive topics in over 98% of cases. Topics studied include medical conditions (cancer,
anorexia etc), sexual orientation, disability, bankruptcy and unemployment. Our method is accurate,
with typical false detection rates of less than 10% (and less than 1% for many sensitive topics).
We also show that detection rates remain high for anonymous users, suggesting that search engines
learn quickly; even without search history as background knowledge. Our estimation of search en-
gine adaptation rates indicate that sensitive topic learning is detectable after as few as 3−4 queries
on average.
Supported by Science Foundation Ireland grant 11/PI/11771.
Author’s addresses: P. Mac Aonghusa, IBM Research, IBM Technology Campus, Dublin, Ireland; Douglas J. Leith, School
of Computer Science and Statistics, Trinity College Dublin, Ireland.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee
provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and
the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored.
Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires
prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
c© YYYY ACM. 2471-2566/YYYY/01-ARTA $15.00
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/0000000.0000000
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article X, Publication date: May 2016.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
4.
08
04
3v
2 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
9 A
ug
 20
16
X:2 P Mac Aonghusa and D. Leith.
The main contributions in this paper are:
A definition of privacy we call ε-indistinguishability that is both compatible with existing pri-
vacy models and readily implementable as a practical user technology
An effective method for change detection across a sequence of queries by collecting and com-
paring responses to a subsequence of preselected probe queries
A fast, scalable estimator of ε-indistinguishability, we call PRI (”PRivacy for Individuals”) and
which we implement using standard tools and apply in subsequent experiments
An extensive measurement campaign showing that evidence of adaptation is easy to detect for a
wide range of sensitive topics.
In this paper we focus on raising awareness of privacy concerns arising from personalisation by
online services. We position our contribution as a starting point in a multi-step program. Our goal
here is to demonstrate that practical individual awareness is possible, providing a stepping stone
toward effective counter-measures.
2. RELATED WORK
Personalisation of web search through implicit data collection – for example location, IP address
and browser agent – is well studied. See [Spiliopoulou et al. 2012] for an historical survey of results
in web mining for personalisation. Even so-called ‘private’ browsing mode may not suffice; in
[Aggarwal et al. 2010], the authors investigate how a range of popular browser extensions and
plugins undermine the security of private browsing.
In [boyd 2011], individual user concerns with privacy are viewed in terms of two major factors –
awareness of a sensitive social situation, and, the ability of an individual to control the social situa-
tion. In this paper we focus on raising awareness through detection of profiling of sensitive topics.
Effective counter measures allowing a user to control their exposure to profiling are outside the
scope of this present paper. Evidence that users are sensitive to personalisation – and will respond
to increased awareness – is given in [Panjwani et al. 2013], where a user study of internet search
users showed a slight preference for personalised content. After raising awareness by fully informing
users about risks to their privacy, the majority of users were satisfied to forego personalisation when
search topics were judged sensitive. In [Agarwal et al. 2013], a larger user study explores privacy
concerns in more depth, finding that users are more concerned about the potential of being shown
suggestive or embarrassing content than they are of tracking.
While improved user experience is generally offered as a positive motivation for user profiling,
for example, see the Google online privacy policy [Foundation 2015b], negative associations have
been reported in the research literature:
Discrimination. Negative consequences associated with personalisation are investigated in
[Sweeney 2013], where an extensive review of adverts from Google and Reuters.com showed
a strong correlation between adverts suggestive of an arrest record and an individual’s ethnicity.
Searches containing first names considered black-identifying were on average 25% more likely
to receive adverts indicative of an arrest record than searches including white-identifying first
names. In [Guha et al. 2010], the authors identified more than half of online advertising targeted
exclusively to gay men was neutral to sexual-orientation – posing a privacy threat through inad-
vertant user clicking. Our experiments confirm that evidence of profiling that could be termed
discriminatory is detectable with high confidence.
Censorship. Personalisation as a form of censorship – termed a filter bubble in [Pariser 2011] – is
explored in [Hannak et al. 2013]. In a filter bubble, a user cannot access subsets of information
because the recommender system algorithm has decided it is irrelevant for that user. In [Hannak
et al. 2013] a filter bubble effect was detected in the case of Google Web Search in a test using
200 users. Censorship is an interesting complimentary perspective on user profiling that is not
considered in this paper.
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Much of the research literature in recommender system privacy has focused on techniques to
implement privacy; for data processing on the server side – or – on the user side, techniques to
obfuscate, encrypt or otherwise hide queries or mask user identity from the recommender. The
query masking or obfuscation technique has been explored extensively, see for example [Howe
et al. 2009; Peddinti and Saxena 2011]. The essential challenge in this type of approach is to define a
practical method of selecting the ‘noise’ queries and clicks to provide a verifiable level of anonymity
while not overly upsetting overall utility. In our experiments we observe the recommender systems
responding quickly to changes in user topic, compensating quickly after topic changes so that ‘noise
injection’ alone may not provide adequate protection.
Several authors have examined privacy in the context of recommender systems, broadly address-
ing the question of data privacy with respect to the user data once collected by the recommender. In
a 2001 work, [Ramakrishnan et al. 2001], the authors identify threats from data linking or combina-
tion by identifying similar patterns of preference or behaviour conjunction with other data sources
to uncover identities and reveal personal details. In their concluding remarks, the authors state that
“the ideal deterrents are better awareness of the issues and more openness in how systems operate
in the marketplace. In particular, individual sites should clearly state the policies and methodologies
they employ with recommender systems”.
Techniques for preserving individual user privacy or anonymity have also been extensively dis-
cussed in the literature. A typical approach is to apply encryption and multi-party computation
techniques to process sensitive user queries, leveraging techniques from the privacy preserving data
mining domain. For example, in [Erkin et al. 2010; Erkin et al. 2011], the authors propose to en-
crypt privacy sensitive data and generate recommendations by processing them under encryption.
Approaches of this type typically rely on a user, or a learning algorithm, being able to identify which
queries are sensitive, and trust in the service provider to perform query processing under secure en-
cryption. In contrast, our approach seeks to inform a user about their ongoing privacy status.
Accountability, and enforcement of accountability, for privacy policy is an active area of research.
Regulatory requirements for data handling in industries such as Healthcare (HIPPA) and Finance
(GLBA) are well established. The position with respect to handling of data collected by online rec-
ommender systems is less clear. In [Datta 2014], the author reviews computational approaches to
specification and enforcement of privacy policies at large scale. Our approach differs in design, be-
ing intended for individual user implementation. While we also make use of inference, it is statistical
inference rather than the logic-based inference approach discussed in [Datta 2014].
Tools that seek to inform a user about whether an adversary is potentially gathering and sharing
information exist. Browser add-ons such as Mozilla Lightbeam, [Foundation 2015c], and Privacy-
Badger, [Foundation 2015a], show a user where data is shared with third parties from sites they visit.
XRay, [Le´cuyer et al. 2014], reports high accuracy in identifying which sources of user data such
as email or web search history might have triggered particular results from online services such as
adverts.
Privad, [Guha et al. 2011], and ObliviAd, [Backes et al. 2012] allow advertisers to provide pri-
vate advertising, by employing intermediate agents to mask direct access to user information. In
both cases external agents hide user intentions and interactions with adverts. ObliviAd use secure
hardware-based private information retrieval for advert distribution, with advertiser billing provided
by secure tokens. These features allow the authors to provide provable cryptographic guarantees of
anonymity for users of the system.
The importance of adverts to commercial search engines is underlined by the volume of research
into how to position adverts to direct user attention to them. The position of commercial content on a
result page is a key determinant of whether an advert will be selected or not. For example, in [Jansen
et al. 2013], the authors determined that the first advert on a page accounts for approximately 80% of
commercial revenue. In [Richardson et al. 2007], the authors include results from user eye-tracking
demonstrating how dramatically a user focuses on the first few results on a page.
Recommender systems continue to evolve more sophisticated methods of content selection. Se-
mantic targetting techniques, where the overall theme of a web-page is used to select contextually
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article X, Publication date: May 2016.
X:4 P Mac Aonghusa and D. Leith.
related adverts, are used by companies such as Google Knowledge Graph, [Graph 2015], and iSense,
[iSense 2015], while Zemanta, [Zemanta 2015], provides a browser add-on that suggests semanti-
cally relevant articles, images, links and keywords to content creators. Experimental results, with
Google in particular, appear to show early promise that the PRI technique applies to content selec-
tion models other than keyword-based .
Modelling a system as a black-box, where internal details of recommender systems algorithms
and settings are unknown to users, is mentioned in several sources [Datta 2014] and [Hannak et al.
2013]. While the term “black-box” is used extensively throughout the privacy literature, the present
authors have not seen black-box testing techniques – such as employing probes to calibrate re-
sponses – using extensively in the privacy literature.
In this paper, we seek a practical approach, allowing a user inform themselves of privacy disclo-
sure threats due to search engine inference. By exploiting the idea that a commercial search engine
combines user data with background knowledge to create personalised recommendations we ask
how to assess ongoing risks to privacy based on simple observation of the recommender? In this
way we help a user to make reasonable assessments of the ongoing risk of disclosure while using a
search engine.
3. THREAT MODEL
We consider privacy for a class of commercial internet systems seeking to maximise expected rev-
enue by personalising commercial content to attract user interest. Users are generally aware of good
privacy practice for obviously personally identifying information – such as name, address and credit
card numbers – reflecting the visibility of personal identifiability as a central concept in informa-
tion privacy regulation [Schwartz and Solove 2011; Ohm 2010]. Personalisation practices, based
on obvious features such as location, IP address and browser identifier, are also well known and
extensively discussed in the literature [Spiliopoulou et al. 2012]. In this paper we focus on detecting
evidence of recommender system learning. User traceability or pseudo-anonymity is not considered.
It seems reasonable to assume that a for-profit commercial search engine selects page content
to maximise its expected revenue. This means that when a search engine infers that a particular
advertising topic is likely to be of interest to a user, and so more likely to generate click through and
sales, it is obliged to use this information when selecting which adverts to display.
In this context the threat model we consider is one of distinguishability rather than individual
identifiability – a search engine does not seek to identify the user as an individual but rather it seeks
to determine the user’s likely interest in commercially valuable topics. Privacy becomes an issue
when any of the topics matches subjects deemed sensitive by the user.
Since a revenue maximising search engine acts to display adverts associated with topics it detects
are most interesting to the user, the potential exists to detect search engine learning via analysis of
changes in the choice of displayed adverts and to inform the user of this learning.
In our experiments we find that adverts do indeed provide sufficiently dynamic content, as we
shall show in Section 5.6. We note that, over the period of short query sessions we consider here,
page content is usually constrained to be relatively insensitive with respect to personalisation in
order to provide so-called rank-stability; link-based search algorithms are termed rank-stable if
small perturbations in the link structure of the input graph do not affect the output ranking order
it produces, [Lempel and Moran 2005] and [Langville and Meyer 2006]. In contrast, adverts may be
chosen relatively freely, a fact which has also been noted by other authors, for example see [Guha
et al. 2010].
Evidence that page content varies for individuals over periods of time has been reported. [Hannak
et al. 2013] also observes that localised content such as news items is necessarily volatile and will
vary to reflect currency. Our focus, in this paper, is on detecting learning by observing adverts and
we do not consider other personalised content such as news and weather specifically in this study.
For the typical period of time of a typical user session in this study – typically less than 20 minutes
– experimental results in Section 5.6 indicate the assumption of “short-term” rank-stability in page
content considered in our study is reasonable.
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4. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
4.1. ε-indistinguishability
We assume that a user interacts with a search engine by issuing a query, receiving a web page in
response and then clicking on one or more items in the response. A single such interaction, labeled
with index j, consists of a query, response page, item-click triple, denoted Ω j = (q j, p j, l j). A user
session of length k > 0 steps consists of a sequence of k individual steps, and is denoted {Ωk}k≥1.
The sequence of interactions {Ωk}k≥1 is jointly observed by the user and the search engine – and
perhaps several other third-party observers.
Let Ek denote the prior evidence – also referred to as background knowledge – available to an
observer at the start of step k. We assume the search engine does not change its background knowl-
edge during a user session other than through Ωk. That is, E1 denotes the prior evidence available to
an observer before the user session begins, e.g. the user’s login profile, historical queries, weblogs
etc, and for k = 2,3, · · · we have,
Ek = {Ek−1,Ωk−1}
Let C = {c1, . . . ,cN} denote a set of interest categories which the user considers to be sensitive,
e.g. bankrupt¸ , cancer¸ , addiction¸ , etc and gather all non-sensitive interest categories into a catch-all
category denoted c¯. The category in which the user is interested in the current session is a random
variable Xc taking values in C∪{c¯}. In subsequent experiments multiple sensitive user categories
will sometimes be aggregated into a single sensitive topic for clarity, so that C∪{c¯} ={sensitive¸ ,
non-sensitive¸ } in this simplified case. The term “category” here denotes a topic or theme of interest
to the user. Since the search engine adversary is regarded as a black-box we do not know if such
user categories correspond to internal classifications by the adversary. Our intent is to detect if there
is evidence of learning about user categories of interest to the user. We do not attempt to understand
what internal classifications – if any – the search engine might apply to the user.
We adopt an indistinguishability definition of disclosure risk, tailored to our particular context:
Definition 4.1 ( ε-indistinguishability ). A user session Ωk satisfies ε-indistinguishability with
respect to sensitive category c ∈C if there exists an ε> 0 such that
Mk(c)≤ eε, k = 1,2, · · · (1)
where
Mk(c) :=
Prob(Xc = c|Ωk,Ek)
Prob(Xc = c|E1) (2)
In other words there is a posteriori indistinguishability of interest in sensitive category c after ob-
serving Ωk, k = 1,2, · · ·.
Given the sequence of observations {Ωk}k≥1 our aim is, with high probability, to (1) determine
whether ε-indistinguishability has been violated for one or more of the sensitive categories in C
(and so the adversary is likely to have successfully learned about the users interest in one or more
of these categories), and (2) identify which of these sensitive categories have been learned.
4.2. Using Probe Queries to Simplify Estimation
Estimating Mk(c) is challenging since it depends on the full user session history {Ω j} j=1,...,k up to
step k. To simplify the task we assume that the user issues a pre-defined probe query at intervals
during the session and that the links in the response to this query are not clicked. In brief, a probe
query should be plausible in relation to a sensitive topic so that it does not suggest a change of
topic to the search engine; a probe query should also be ambiguous so that the search engine has
several possible adaptations to the probe query. In Section 5.3 experimental probe query selection
is discussed, where selecting high-frequency terms appearing on multiple search result pages, while
taking care to avoid obviously revealing terms, is shown to be a practical method of probe selection.
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In practice, a probe query might be issued in an automated manner by the user’s browser and the
response processed in the background so as not to disturb the user.
In addition, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Informative Probe Query). Let K ⊂ {1,2, · · ·} label the subsequence of steps at
which a probe query is issued. At each step k ∈ K at which a probe query is issued,
Prob(Xc = c|Ωk,Ek)
Prob(Xc = c|E1) =
Prob(Xc = c|Ωk,E1)
Prob(Xc = c|E1) (3)
That is, it is not necessary to explicitly use knowledge of the search history during the current
session when estimating Mk(c) as this is already reflected in the response to the probe query at step
k. Assumption 1 greatly simplifies estimation as it means we do not have to take account of the full
search history, but requires that the response to the probe query reveals any search engine learning
of interest in sensitive category c which has occurred. Methods for the selection of an appropriate
probe query that tends to elicit revealing responses are discussed in detail in Section 5.3.
Assumption 2 (Revealing Adverts). In the search engine response to the probe query at step
k it is the adverts ak on response page pk which primarily reveal learning of sensitive categories.
Therefore, since the probe query is fixed and the response page – for probe queries – is not clicked
by the user,
Prob(Xc = c|Ωk,E1) = Prob(Xc = c|ak,E1), k ∈ K (4)
This is in line with the observation in Section 3 that, over the lifetime of a typical user session,
the informational response (search result links etc) to a query tends to be insensitive to learning of
user interests. Note that personalisation of search results over longer time scales e.g. in response to
changes in geographic location may still occur.
Under Assumptions 1-2, when
Mk(c) =
Prob(Xc = c|ak,E1)
Prob(Xc = c|E1) > e
ε (5)
for any k ∈ K then ε-indistinguishability is violated. To ensure that the converse holds, namely that
when Mk(c) ≤ eε for all k ∈ K then ε-indistinguishability is satisfied, we also need the following
assumption.
Assumption 3 (Sufficiency of Sampling). When Mk(c) ≤ eε for k ∈ K then Mk(c) ≤ eε for k ∈
{1,2, · · ·}. That is, when ε-indistinguishability is satisfied at the subsequence of steps K at which
the probe query is issued then it is satisfied at all steps.
In practice it can be difficult to verify whether Assumption 3 holds or not. When we cannot rely on
Assumption 3 then, as already noted, violations Mk(c)> eε for k ∈ K are still informative of disclo-
sure risk and analysis based on the values Mk(c), k ∈ K should be regarded as an underestimate, or
lower bound, of disclosure risk for the user.
4.3. Advert Text Processing
We briefly summarise Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques we use to preprocess advert
text into a format for analysis. For a full treatment of these techniques, using the Python language,
see [Bird et al. 2009].
In the first preprocessing step, advert text from result pages is extracted and tokenised into indi-
vidual words by using white-spaces and punctuation as token separators. Common, uninformative
high-frequency stop-words are removed and stemming is performed to remove common prefixes
and suffixes, for example, {clicking, clicks, clicked}→{click} . After preprocessing and during the
training phase we assign each unique keyword an integer id and also count the keyword’s frequency
of occurrence in the training set to produce a lookup table of keyword id-frequency pairs. The
lookup table of keywords and associated occurence counts is generally termed a Term-Frequency
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(TF) representation in NLP. Because the previous preprocessing step has removed uninformative
high frequency words and has reduced word variations through stemming, the TF table transforms
advert text to a smaller more computable representation.
During subsequent testing, an advert encountered on a result page is first preprocessed and then
mapped to keyword ids the TF table. Preprocessing an advert in this way is called vectorisation in
NLP, where the nth component of the vectorised advert is the number of occurences in the advert of
the keyword stem with integer id n. Given two vectorised adverts it is now possible, for example, to
compute similarity measures between adverts using any convenient vector metric – such as Cosine
Similarity which is effectively vector inner product.
To streamline notation we assume that the available advert locations are the same for all
pages pk, k = 1,2, · · ·. Let ak = {a1,k, · · · ,an,k} be the set of adverts on page pk. An advert
ai,k = {w1,w2, · · · ,w|ai,k|} appearing on a result page is modelled as a sequence of words drawn
from a set of natural language terms D (as discussed later, in our work we derive this set from train-
ing data). In practice result pages may contain localised content, such as news and weather, as well
as other format content such as images and links, but leave consideration of these to future work.
We represent text preprocessing operations such as stemming and stop word removal operations
as a filter over D. Specifically, let f : D→ D˜∪ /0 be a text processing/filtering map taking words in
dictionary D either to a content-bearing term in set D˜ or to a null term /0 corresponding to deletion
of the word. Let a˜i,k = { f (w1), f (w2), . . . , f (w|ai,k|)} denote the sequence of content-bearing terms
obtained by applying map f to advert ai,k and let a˜k = {a˜1,k, · · · , a˜n,k}.
Filtering implies a subtle assumption common in text classification, namely that preprocessing
and filtering only removes statistically uniformative content that is not significant for subsequent
analysis. That is, for any advert ak and category c,
Prob(Xc = c|ak) = Prob(Xc = c| a˜k) (6)
In addition, we assume that the content-bearing terms in D˜ have distinct meanings in the following
sense.
Let ∆w,k be a random variable which takes value 1 when a term drawn uniformly at random1
from the page adverts a˜k equals w and ∆w,k equals 0 otherwise. Hence, when ∆w,k = 1 then term
w is known to be contained in the adverts displayed on a page. Our assumption is that after text
processing Prob(Xc = c|a˜k,E1) possesses the following mixture form:
Assumption 4 (Text Processing).
Prob(Xc = c|a˜k,E1) = ∑
w∈D˜
Prob(Xc = c|∆w,k = 1,E1)Prob(∆w,k = 1|a˜k,E1) (7)
Assumption 4 states that categories and adverts are correlated through the keyword terms. It is a
similar to the assumption underpinning techniques such as Latent Class Analysis and Collaborative
Filtering in recommender systems [Ricci et al. 2010].
To streamline notation, from now on we omit the tilde ˜ denoting filtered text, noting that all text
is assumed to be filtered through the mapping f unless stated otherwise.
1 Precisely, let bk denote the sequence of length ∑ni=1|a˜i,k| obtained by concatenating sequences a˜i,k , i = 1, · · · ,n. Select an
index uniformly at random from {1, · · · ,∑ni=1|a˜i,k|} and if the term in bk at that index equals w then ∆w,k = 1, else ∆w,k = 0.
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4.4. Bayesian Estimator
By Assumptions 1, 2 and 4 we have:
Mk(c) = ∑
w∈D
Prob(Xc = c|∆w,k = 1,E1)Prob(∆w,k = 1|ak,E1)
Prob(Xc = c|E1)
(a)
= ∑
w∈D
Prob(∆w,k = 1|c,E1)Prob(∆w,k = 1|ak,E1)
Prob(∆w,k = 1|E1) (8)
= ∑
w∈D
pc,E1 pak,E1
pE1
(9)
where equality (a) follows from Bayes Theorem and
pc,E1 := Prob(∆w,k = 1|c,E1) (10)
pak,E1 := Prob(∆w,k = 1|ak,E1) (11)
pE1 := Prob(∆w,k = 1|E1) (12)
We can define empirical estimators for pc,E1 , pak,E1 and pE1 in the obvious way, as follows.
Assume the availability of a training data set T consisting of (label,advert) pairs, where the label is
the category in C∪{c¯} with which the corresponding advert is associated. Approximate the prior
evidence at the begining of the query session empirically with this training data: Eˆ1 = T . Text
preprocessing of T by filtering produces a dictionary D. Given the dictionary D, let φD(x|X) denote
the frequency with which an item x ∈ D occurs in sequence X = {x1,x2, · · · ,x|X |}. That is,
φD(x|X) =
{ |{i:i∈{1,···,|X |},xi=x}|
|X | if x ∈ D
0 if x /∈ D (13)
From the definition of ∆w,k we can now define the following estimator pˆak,Eˆ1 for pak,Eˆ1 :
pˆak,Eˆ1 = ∑
a∈ak
φD(w|a) (14)
Similarly, we define the following empirical estimator pˆEˆ1 for pEˆ1 :
pˆEˆ1 = ∑
a∈T
φD(w|a) (15)
where the sum is over adverts in T . Letting T (c) denote the subset of T where the label is category
c, we also obtain an empirical estimator pˆc,Eˆ1 for pc,Eˆ1 :
pˆc,Eˆ1 = ∑
a∈T (c)
φD(w|a) (16)
Combining these estimates using (9) then yields the following estimator for Mk(c):
Mˆk(c) = ∑
w∈D
(
∑a∈T (c) φD(w|a)
∑a∈T φD(w|a)
· ∑
a∈ak
φD(w|a)
)
(17)
We refer to the expression for Mˆk(c) as the PRI estimator.
4.5. Example
Consider the following illustrative example. Let C = {prostate¸ } (i.e. we have a single sensitive cate-
gory), label non-sensitive category c¯ as other and suppose the training set (after text pre-processing)
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article X, Publication date: May 2016.
Don’t let Google know I’m lonely! X:9
Table I: Illustrative example estimator values.
w ∑a∈T φD(w|a) ∑a∈T (c) φD(w|a)
c = prostate c¯ = other
prostat, cancer 512
5
12 0
possibl, learn, here 16
1
6 0
treat, suffer 512
1
4
1
6
risk 512
1
6
1
4
revers, natur, lifetim 16 0
1
6
is,
T = {(prostate, {prostat cancer possibl risk learn here}),
(prostate, {prostat cancer suffer treat}),
(other, {diabet treatment suffer discov revers natur}),
(other, {discov lifetim risk diabet})}
Dictionary D therefore consists of the terms {prostat, cancer, diabet, discov, possibl, learn, here,
treat, risk, suffer, revers, natur, lifetim}. The PRI estimator values are given in Table II.
An advert with text terms (after filtering)
a = {patient choos safer treat here}
is observed. Since the terms patient, choos, safer do not appear in the training data set – only the
terms treat, here contribute to MˆK(c). We have φD(w|a) = 15 for w ∈ {treat, here} and so MˆK(c) =
8
25 = 0.32 for c = prostate. For comparison, MˆK(c) =
2
25 = 0.08 for c = other. The advert in this
example is in fact taken from the Google result page for a probe query during a session where the
user is carrying out searches related to prostate cancer. The high value for MˆK(c) when c= prostate
is therefore as expected.
5. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
5.1. Hardware/Software Setup
Data was collected using two Linux virtual machines located in a University domain supporting
approximately 9,000 users. Custom scripts were written to automate query execution and response
collection. These scripts used Python v2.7, BeautifulSoup v4.3.2 for HTML processing and phan-
tomjs v1.9.8 for browser automation. Analysis of results was performed on a 2.3 GHz Intel Core
i7 MacBook Pro. The Python SciKit toolkit v0.15 [Pedregosa et al. 2011] was used for text prepro-
cessing. Numeric processing was performed using the NumPy v1.8.2 numerical processing tookit
[Idris 2012].
5.2. User Session Category Selection and Query Creation
We select twelve user interest categories to study, detailed in Table II. Of the eleven sensitive topics,
(i) ten are sensitive categories associated with subjects generally identified as causes of discrimina-
tion (medical condition, sexual orientation etc) or sensitive personal conditions (gambling addition,
financial problems etc), see for example [Commission 2015] (ii) a further sensitive topic is related
to London as a specific destination location, providing an obviously interesting yet potentially sensi-
tive topic that a search engine might track, (iii) the last topic is a non-sensitive category labeled other¸
which is based on the top-50 queries taken from Google Trends [Google 2015], providing the catch-
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Table II: Categories and associated keyword terms .
Category Keywords
anorexia¸ nerves eating disorder body image binge diet weight lose fat
bankrupt¸ bankrupt insolvent bad credit poor credit clear your debts insolvency payday insolvent any
purpose quick cash benefits low income
diabetes¸ diabetes mellitus hyperglycaemia blood sugar insulin resistance
disabled¸ disabled special needs accessibility wheelchair
divorce¸ divorce separation family law
gambling addiction¸ uncontrollable addiction compulsive dependency problem support counselling advice
therapist therapy help treatment therapeutic recovery anonymous
gay (homosexuality)¸ gay queer lesbian homosexual bisexual transgender LGBT dyke queen homo
location (london)¸ london england uk
payday loan¸ default unsecured debt consolidate advice payday cheap
prostate cancer¸ prostate cancer PSA male urethra urination
unemployed¸ job seeker recruit search position cv work employment
other¸ Select the top-50 queries on Google Trends as examples of non-sensitive queries, excluding
terms appearing in sensitive topics.
all other¸ topic representing topics that are not sensitive. The queries selected from Google Trends
for the non-sensitive topic do not contain terms appearing in any of the sensitive topic queries.
For each category apart from other, a keyword list is created by extracting associated terms from
curated sources including Wikipedia (common terms co-occurring on the category page) and Open
Directory Project (pages and sub-topics associated with a category). These are detailed in Table II.
Candidate search queries are then generated for each category by drawing groups of one or more
keywords uniformly at random with replacement from the keyword lists. These candidate queries
are manually augmented with common words (and, of etc) to yield queries resembling the English
language. In this way a keyword such as fat, for example, might be transformed into a query “why
am i so fat”. Non-sensical or overly robotic queries are removed by manual inspection. For the other¸
category, queries are taken from the top-50 on Google Trends.
Finally, to construct sequences of queries for use in user sessions, a predefined probe query is in-
serted at intervals of 1−5 queries. In this way we obtain twelve “scripts” of queries, each consisting
of between 25− 40 queries including the inserted probe queries. A user session then consists of a
single iteration of a single script run from beginning to end.
5.3. Selecting Informative Probe Queries
A probe query is required to be sufficiently informative that it reveals adaptation in the user-search
engine interaction (Assumption 1), but should not overly disturb the search engines responses to user
queries (so as to preserve the utility of the search engine for the user). To meet these requirements
we propose that a good probe query should possess the following general characteristics:
Ambiguity. It should be meaningful with respect to the sensitive topic but allow more than one
interpretation, so allowing the search engine to choose from a variety of plausible topics.
Consistency. It should be consistent with the user’s information requirement so as not to disturb
search engine learning. The probe should not “surprise” the search engine.
Candidate probe query keywords were identified by running each of the scripts in Table II three
times, without probe queries, and collecting the response pages. We filtered the text in the response
pages by stemming terms and removing stopwords. Next term frequency analysis of the filtered
terms was performed and the top 10 terms identified, see Table III.
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Table III: Top-10 candidate probe terms with term frequency (TF) of occurrence.
Google Bing Both
Rank Term TF Term TF Term TF
1 help 4.37 help 4.62 help 4.49
2 advice 4.32 advice 3.45 advice 4.02
3 symptom 1.81 symptom 2.38 symptom 2.04
4 cause 0.90 check 0.77 cause 0.82
5 homecare 0.60 cause 0.68 person 0.53
6 offer 0.54 person 0.60 checker 0.49
7 person 0.48 plan 0.58 check 0.48
8 answer 0.48 checker 0.58 sign 0.45
9 gamble 0.44 sign 0.57 offer 0.43
10 checker 0.43 hiv 0.56 homecare 0.37
It can be seen that the top-4 words appearing in both Google and Bing search results are {help,
advice, symptom, cause} and that these are significantly more frequent than lower ranked terms.
Additionally these terms are in the top-5 for each of Google and Bing individually. We use these
keywords to form two probe queries: “symptoms and causes” for disease and medical topics and
“help and advice” for non-medical topics.
As a rough test of the ambiguity requirement for a probe query discussed in Section 4.2, we used
the number of results indicator provided by each search engine. We recorded the number of results
N(c) returned from querying for sensitive topic c and also the number of results N(c, p j), j = 1,2
returned when each of the candidate probe queries is appended to the queries for topic c (with
p1=“symptoms and causes” and p2 =“help and advice” ). We expect N(c, p j)< N(c) since the extra
query text will narrow the query to some extent. However, we would like to avoid this narrowing
being too great, e.g. we would certainly like to avoid N(c, p j) = 0. The values measured are reported
in Table IV for Google. Also reported in this table is the ratio Pˆ(c|p j) = N(c,p j)N(c) . It can be seen that
Pˆ(c|p1) = 0 for the bankrupt¸ topic and has a low value for gambling¸ , gay¸ and unemployed¸ . In
contrast, for these topics Pˆ(c|p2) has a fairly high value. This therefore indicates the use of the
“help and advice” probe query for non-medical topics rather than the “symptoms and causes” probe
query, which seems intuitive. Based on Table IV the “help and advice” probe query also seems
reasonable for use with medical topics, and Pˆ(c|p1) (corresponding to the “symptoms and causes”
probe) is also reasonable for these topics. Again, this is as might be expected.
5.4. User Click Emulation
To reduce the appearance of robotic interaction, the script automation program inserts a random
pause of 1 to 10 seconds between queries, see Table V for an example. After remaining 5 seconds
on a clicked link page, the browser “back” button is invoked to navigate back to the search result
page.
To emulate user clicking, we adopt the following user click model. Given the response page
generated in response to a query, for each search result and advert we calculate the Term-Frequency
(TF) of the visible text with respect to the keywords associated with session interest category, see
Table II. When the score is T F > 0.1, the item is clicked, otherwise it is not clicked. As mentioned
in Section 4.2, search results in response to probe queries are not clicked.
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Table IV: Approximate result numbers returned by Google on different topics and for different
choices of probe query. Counts are in units of millions.
p1 = ’symptoms and causes’ p2 = ’help and advice’
Topic = c N(c) N(c,p1) Pˆ(c|p1) N(c, p2) Pˆ(c|p2)
anorexia¸ 28.5 0.834 3% 1.78 6%
bankrupt¸ 86.9 0.434 0% 48.6 56%
diabetes¸ 267 66.5 25% 114 43%
disabled¸ 506 26 5% 159 31%
divorce¸ 185 11.1 6% 79.7 43%
gambling¸ 103 0.526 1% 30.6 30%
gay¸ 782 9.53 1% 119 15%
location (london)¸ 1930 72.2 4% 373 19%
payday¸ 70.3 45.9 65% 6.57 9%
prostate¸ 83.3 14.7 18% 12.5 15%
unemployed¸ 54.8 0.619 1% 48.1 88%
Table V: Example query script. The command !wait n instructs the Python script to wait n seconds
! keywords: london england uk
! probe: help and advice
help and advice
! wait 7
weather forecast for london
! wait 5
find hotels in london city
! wait 3
help and advice
! wait 7
cheap hotels in london
! wait 10
hotels in regents park cheap
! wait 7
marriott courtyard regents park
! wait 4
help and advice
! wait 7
things to do london next week
! wait 5
regents park hotels
! wait 7
get cheap london show tickets
! wait 7
shows on london now
! wait 5
tickets london shows
! wait 7
help and advice
5.5. Data Collection
Data was gathered and analysed from the Google Search2 and Bing3 search engines. Data was
gathered over a period of 4 weeks during November and December 2014. Scripts were executed
daily in the morning and evening over 28 days.
We took a number of precautions to minimise interactions between runs of each script – cleaning
cookies, history and cache before and after scripts, terminating the session and logging the user out,
and waiting for a minimum of twenty minutes between runs to ensure connections are reset or timed
out. All scripts were run for 3 registered users and 1 anonymous user, and for both the Google and
Bing search engines, yielding a data set consisting of 37,134 queries and response.
2www.google.com
3www.bing.com
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Table VI: Summary of training and test data sets. Nqueries is the number of user search queries and
Nprobes the number of probe queries for which data was collected.
Training Data Sets Test Data Sets
Name Nqueries Nprobes Nqueries Nprobes
Bing 1,051 367 10,970 3,795
Google 1,343 451 14,669 4,488
Table VII: Average percentage content change per instance of probe query, grouped by topic and
search engine.
Bing Google
Topic Advert Link Advert Link
anorexia 65.4% ± 7.7% 3.6% ± 0.3% 34.8% ± 1.5% 0.9% ± 0.2%
bankrupt 15.8% ± 1.5% 5.0% ± 0.3% 39.0% ± 2.5% 2.0% ± 0.3%
diabetes 49.4% ± 12.5% 3.9% ± 0.3% 39.5% ± 1.7% 0.9% ± 0.2%
disabled 12.4% ± 1.0% 3.5% ± 0.2% 17.3% ± 1.7% 2.1% ± 0.3%
divorce 15.8% ± 1.7% 4.7% ± 0.4% 22.1% ± 2.5% 2.9% ± 0.5%
gambling 15.7% ± 1.3% 4.0% ± 0.2% 34.2% ± 1.7% 1.8% ± 0.3%
gay 13.8% ± 1.3% 4.0% ± 0.2% 34.3% ± 1.8% 2.4% ± 0.3%
location 16.3% ± 1.5% 4.8% ± 0.3% 25.3% ± 2.1% 2.4% ± 0.4%
payday 17.4% ± 1.4% 3.9% ± 0.2% 29.7% ± 1.7% 1.4% ± 0.3%
prostate 52.6% ± 6.8% 3.7% ± 0.3% 34.6% ± 1.4% 0.9% ± 0.2%
unemployed 14.3% ± 1.2% 4.5% ± 0.3% 22.8% ± 1.8% 2.9% ± 0.5%
other 17.8% ± 27.9% 3.7% ± 0.2% 27.5% ± 1.5% 1.4% ± 0.2%
The data was partitioned into training and test data sets, see Table VI. The test data contains 28
separate runs of each of the 12 test scripts. For training and performance evaluation we labeled all
queries in a session with the intended topic of the session as given by the query script used. For
example, all queries from a session about prostate¸ are labeled as prostate¸ or sensitive¸ , including
probe queries. In this respect the labels capture the intended behavior, rather than attempting an
individual interpretation of specific query keywords durring a user session.
5.6. Feature Selection: Adverts or Links?
Search result pages contain multiple content types, in particular search links and adverts. For the
collected data sets Table VII summarises the percentage change in the text of search links and
adverts for each of the interest categories and for each search engine. Also shown is ± the standard
error in the mean. It can be seen that link text changes very little, less than 3% for Google and 5%
for Bing. In contrast it can be seen that the advert text is much more dynamic with 12.4%−65.5%
of the advert text changing for Bing and 17.3%−39% for Google.
This data provides quite strong support for Assumption 2 above, namely that it is the adverts
which primarily reveal personalised learning by the search engine.
6. DETECTING DISCLOSURE
As already discussed, our approach is to issue a sequence of probe queries at steps k ∈K interleaved
amongst the user queries, use the PRI estimator to estimate Mˆk(c), k ∈ K based on the response to
each probe query and then look for significant changes in these Mˆk(c) values. To determine whether
changes are significant, for each topic c∈C we use the mean plus/minus three standard deviations to
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Table VIII: Measured detection rate of search engine learning of at least one occurence of one or
more sensitive topics during a 5 probe session.
Predicted
Bing Google
Sens. Non-sens. Sens. Non-sens.
Expected
Sensitive 91% 9% 100% 0%
Non-sensitive 1% 99% 1% 99%
define a confidence interval (the mean and standard deviation are estimated using the training data).
The choice of three standard deviations is taken after performing verification testing on the training
data before testing. Choosing the number of standard deviations to use is a balance – too small a
number of standard deviations generates excessive “False Negatives” while too large a number of
standard deviations results in a larger number of “False Positives”.
6.1. Sensitive – Non-sensitive Detection
We begin by evaluating the performance of this approach for detecting whether learning of any sen-
sitive topics has taken place or not during a query session, without trying to specify which sensitive
topics are involved. For this we use the catch-all other topic c¯. Namely, when the estimate Mˆk(c¯)
lies outside its confidence interval during a user session we take this as rejecting the hypothesis that
no learning of sensitive topics has occurred during that session. We standardise a query session to
consist of the first 5 probe queries in a run for the purposes of analysis.
The plots in Figure 1 illustrates this procedure for a user session on the topic gambling¸ with the
Google search engine. It can be seen from Figure 1(a) that Mˆk for the other¸ topic (i.e. c¯) quickly
leaves its confidence interval as the session progresses (probe 1 is detected as other¸ , however the
other probe queries {0,2,3,4} lie outside the other¸ confidence interval). In comparison, it can be
seen from Figure 1(b) that Mˆk for the gambling¸ topic (i.e. the topic which matches the user session)
stays close to the confidence interval throughout the user session. The corresponding results for the
Bing search engine are shown in Figure 2 and exhibit similar behaviour.
Table VIII summarises the detection performance on a full set of Bing and Google test data. We
declare a positive detection when at least one probe query in a session of 5 probes is detected as
sensitive. For user sessions on sensitive topics it can be seen that the detection accuracy is high.
For Google, 100% of user sessions on a sensitive topic reject the hypothesis that no learning of the
sensitive topic by the search engine has taken place and so are identified as sensitive. For Bing the
corresponding detection rate is 91%. Recall that this hypothesis testing is being carried out based
purely on the adverts in the response pages to user queries, and the queries themselves are not being
used. We manually inspected a sample of the user sessions, confirming the results of Table VII, that
the displayed adverts consistently change signficantly over the course of user sessions on sensitive
topics. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that learning by the search engine has indeed occurred.
That is, the rejection of the hypothesis that no learning has occured that is reported in Table VIII
appears to be justified.
Table VIII also shows the percentage of user sessions which are sensitive but which are flagged
as non-sensitive, which can be interpreted as the false negative rate. For Google, no sensitive ses-
sions are classed as non-sensitive, and for Bing 9% are classes as non-sensitive. Also shown in the
table is the percentage of user sessions which are non-sensitive but are flagged as sensitive, which
can be interpreted as the false positive rate. This is low at 1% for both search engines. A manual
inspection of the data shows that the first probe in a session can be misdetected sometimes, demon-
strating a topic lag effect after there is a change in topic. The influence of the first probe makes it
difficult to distinguish sensitive/non-sensitive based on observation of a single step. We will discuss
misdetection in detail in Section 6.5.
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(a) Expect gambling¸ , detect other¸ .
(b) Expect gambling¸ , detect gambling¸ .
Fig. 1: Illustrating detection of learning for a user session on topic gambling¸ . Shaded areas indicate
the confidence interval for Mˆk for the other¸ topic in the upper figure, and for the gambling¸ topic in
the lower figure. Google search engine.
Overall, the results in Table VIII indicate that the proposed approach can correctly identify po-
tential privacy concerns for sensitive topics while keeping noise levels from false positive detections
low.
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(a) Expect gambling¸ , detect other¸ .
(b) Expect gambling¸ , detect gambling¸ .
Fig. 2: Illustrating detection of learning for a user session on topic gambling¸ . Shaded areas indicate
the confidence interval for Mˆk for the other¸ topic in the upper figure, and for the gambling¸ topic in
the lower figure. Bing search engine.
We comment briefly on the difference in Table VIII in the measured False Negative rates for the
two search engines. This difference is at least partially explained by two factors. The first is that
Bing seems to be slower at adapting to changes in session topic than Google, see Section 6.5. This
apparent difference in adaptation rate is also observable by comparing Figures 1(b) and 2(b), noting
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Table IX: Measured detection rate of search engine learning of individual sensitive topics.
(a) Bing
Reference Topic
anorexia bankrupt diabetes disabled divorce gambling gay location payday prostate unemployed
True Detect 100% 98% 100% 99% 99% 99% 98% 99% 99% 99% 99%
True Other 100% 91% 93% 93% 98% 95% 100% 87% 92% 96% 97%
False Detect 0% 9% 7% 7% 2% 5% 0% 13% 8% 4% 3%
False Other 0% 2% 0% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 1% 1% 1%
(b) Google
Reference Topic
anorexia bankrupt diabetes disabled divorce gambling gay location payday prostate unemployed
True Detect 100% 100% 96% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99% 99% 99% 100%
True Other 96% 96% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
False Detect 4% 4% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
False Other 0% 0% 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 0%
the differences in behaviour of the confidence intervals for the gambling topic. The second factor
is differences between the search engines in the range and diversity of the available adverts across
the various topics. For example, analysis of our test data shows that Google has on average 3.3
unique adverts per probe across all topics whereas Bing has a lower average of 1.7 unique adverts
per probe. This suggests that Google’s dominant position in the search market means it may have a
larger advert pool allowing more finely tuned fitting of adverts to detected topics of interest.
6.2. Individual Sensitive Topic Detection
We now evaluate the detection performance for individual sensitive topics. For each sensitive topic c
studied, when (i) the estimated Mˆk(c) lies inside the confidence interval for that topic and (ii) Mˆk(c¯)
lies outside the confidence interval for the catch-all other topic (i.e. c¯), then we say that we cannot
reject the hypothesis that learning of topic c has occurred.
Table IX summarises the detection performance for the Bing and Google test data for each of
the sensitive topics studied. When evidence of learning of sensitive topic c is detected and the user
session is on topic c then we label this a “True Detect”, otherwise we label this a “False Detect”.
Conversely, when no evidence is found of topic c then when the user session is in fact on topic c we
label this a “False Other”, otherwise we label this a “True Other”. Again, recall that the hypothesis
testing here is being carried out based purely on the adverts in the response pages to probe queries.
In the Google results in Table IX(b), it can be seen that “True Detect” and “True Other” results
range from 96− 100% across all sensitive topics. “False Detect” results, corresponding to false
positives, lie in a range of 0−8%. “False Other” results, corresponding to false negatives, are in the
range 0− 4%. We note that topics such as bankrupt¸ and payday¸ tended to share adverts related to
financial services, see next section, making these topics harder to distinguish from one another. This
data therefore provides strong support for the assertion that detection of individual sensitive topics
is indeed feasible with Google.
Table IX(a) presents the corresponding results for Bing. The “False Detect” results, corresponding
to false positives, tend to be higher than for the Google data. We note that the responses for some
sensitive topics overlap in terms of advert content and are not readily differentiated in our data
for Bing search (as already noted, in our data set we find that Bing displays fewer unique adverts
than Google). Since our test classifies all non-sensitive topics as other¸ then sensitive topics that
share adverts with other¸ may increase the number of false positives. Overall, the detection rate for
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individual sensitive topics is notably high (exceeding 98%) and the false positive rate remains below
10% except for the location¸ topic.
We next test whether probe queries can themselves generate significant levels of false positive
sensitive topic detections. We constructed a test script consisting of randomly selected queries from
Google Trends into which we injected the previously selected probe queries. This randomised script
was executed for both Bing and Google and for each of our user configurations. Relevant result
items appearing on non-probe queries were clicked. In total 1,264 probe queries were tested for
both Bing and Google using the PRI framework. Tests yielded a 0% sensitive topic detection rate
for any sensitive topic in combinations of search engine and users. We conclude that the selected
probe queries do not themselves generate a significant amount of false sensitive topic detection.
6.3. Topic Similarity and Topic Confusion
Intuitively, we expect that some sensitive topics are similar in the sense that similar adverts tend to
be associated with each. For example, the adverts prompted by the bankrupt¸ topic, which relates to
insolvency, might be expected to have some overlap with the payday¸ topic, which relates to short-
term loans.
We can gain some insight into this via the Mˆk(c) estimates for each topic. Figure 3 shows the
average Mˆk(c) measured for each topic c vs the user session topic. That is, cell (i, j) shows the
average Mˆk(c) measured value attained by topic j when running query scripts for reference topic i.
Each cell is heat-mapped within its row, from brightest for maximum value to darkest for lowest
value per row, to improve readability. Figure 3(a) shows results for the Google data and Figure 3(b)
for the Bing data.
For the Google data, it can be seen that the maximum element in each row and column is the
diagonal element, as expected from the results presented in the previous section. However, it can
also be seen that the payday¸ topic has a significantly higher Mˆk(c) value than other topics for user
sessions on the bankrupt¸ topic. Similarly, the bankrupt¸ topic has a significantly higher Mˆk(c) value
for user sessions on the payday¸ topic. Less pronounced, but still evident, is that all health related
topics tend have a higher Mˆk(c) value whenever the user session is on a health topic. For example,
diabetes¸ and prostate¸ have elevated Mˆk(c) values for user sessions on anorexia¸ .
For the Bing data in Figure 3(b) it can be seen that the results are more complicated. As with
Google, the adverts for the payday¸ and bankrupt¸ topics show correlated behaviour. Similarly, the
adverts for health-related topics tend to be correlated. However, the Bing adverts for the disabled¸ ,
divorce¸ , gambling¸ , gay¸ and unemployed¸ topics also exhibit significant correlation. This is consistent
with the results in the previous section where it was observed that topics for Bing appear less readily
distinguishable, possibly due to the smaller size of the pool of available adverts.
While the existence of correlation among topics is itself unsurprising, the fact that the proposed
approach for detecting search engine learning is able to uncover this correlation provides additional
support for the effectiveness of the approach. It also suggests that the potential exists to use the
approach to infer additional information from displayed adverts. We explore this further in the
following sections.
6.4. You click – therefore – I learn!
In addition to entering queries, users provide feedback to the search engine via the links that they
click. Since clicking is an active step, we might expect it to influence search engine learning. Sep-
arate sets of non-click data were collected by running a single iteration of all of the test scripts on
both search engines with user clicking turned off. Table X shows the percentage change in the aver-
age Mˆk(c) score for each test topic with and without user clicking of relevant search results. It can
be seen that all topics had higher Mˆk(c) values when the user clicks on relevant links, suggesting
that user clicks are actively used by the search engine for learning.
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(a) Google
(b) Bing
Fig. 3: Average Mˆk(c) measured by topic.
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Table X: Percentage increase in Mˆk(c) by topic for click versus non-click. Google search data.
Topic – % Increase in Mˆk(c)
anorexia¸ 49% divorce¸ 153% payday¸ 62%
bankrupt¸ 30% gambling¸ 108% prostate¸ 451%
diabetes¸ 417% gay¸ 158% unemployed¸ 62%
disabled¸ 57% location¸ 63% other¸ 233%
Table XI: Estimated probabilities of misclassification of various lengths and probe number of first
misclassification in a session.
Number of Consecutive Misclassifications (X) Probe ID of First Misclassification (Y)
Bing Google Bing Google
P(X = 1) 0.23 0.95 P(Y = 1) 0.92 0.98
P(X = 2) 0.77 0.05 P(Y = 2) 0.03 0.01
P(X = 3) 0.00 0.00 P(Y = 3) 0.04 0.01
P(X = 4) 0.00 0.00 P(Y = 4) 0.00 0.00
P(X = 5) 0.00 0.00 P(Y = 5) 0.00 0.00
6.5. Time to Learn?
Inspection of the test data reveals that correct topic identification sometimes lags by one to two
probes at the start of a new user session. This accounts for approximately 70% of cases where “False
Detects” and “False Other” results are encounted in testing. Examination of these cases provides
insight into the observed speed of recommender learning, and the potential consequences for noise
based privacy defences. Letting X denote the random variable counting the number of consecutive
misclassifications occurring together, then dividing by the total number of misclassifications we can
estimate the probability that X = 1, X = 2, etc. This data is shown in the first column of Table XI.
It can be seen that there are no runs of more than two misclassifications and the average length of a
run of misclassifications is,
E[X ; Bing ] = 1.77
E[X ; Google ] = 1.05
Letting Y be a random variable indicating the probe sequence number where a “False Detects”
or “False Other” event first occurs, Table XI reports the estinated probability that Y = 1, Y = 2, etc.
As expected the overwhelming majority for “False Detects” and “False Other” events happen on the
first probe in a session, with P(Y = 1)> 0.90 for both Bing and Google.
The data in Table XI therefore suggests that Google search takes an average of 1.05 probe queries
and Bing takes an average of 1.77 probe queries to re-callibrate learning after a topic change. On
average probe queries in the test data were issued after 4 user queries. Hence, Google appears
to adapt to a new topic in approximately 4 queries, while Bing requires approximately 7 queries.
Rapid recalibration can also be seen in Table XII by looking at sensitive topic classification recall for
Google when successive probe queries are excluded from the calculation. When every probe query
is included true positive recall is 62%. True positive accuracy improves once the first probe query is
excluded and stabilises at 66% thereafter. The false positive rates are low in all cases, falling to 0%
when the first three probes are excluded.
This means that a privacy defence based on random topic changes achieved, for example, by
injecting spurious queries, could prove to be ineffective unless the spurious queries are repeated at
intervals of less than every 4 real queries for Google and 7 for Bing. This is a considerable overhead.
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Table XII: Recall rate by probe query excluding successive probe queries – Google.
Include
All
Exclude
k = 1
Exclude
k = 1,2
Exclude
k =
1,2,3
True Positive 62% 66% 66% 66%
False Positive 1% 1% 1% 0%
Fig. 4: Average Mˆk(c) by topic. Anonymous user, Google test data
Table XIII: Measured detection rate of search engine learning for an anonymous user.
Predicted
Bing Google
Sensitive Non-sensitive Sensitive Non-sensitive
Expected
Sensitive 83% 0% 100% 0%
Non-sensitive 17% 100% 0% 100%
6.6. Logged-in vs Anonymous
We collected data for user sessions both when the user is logged-in and when the user is anonymous.
As already noted, we clean local caches and user session data between each user session.
Figure 4 shows the average Mˆk(c) measured for each topic for the Google search engine when the
user is not logged in. It can be seen that this shows a similar overall pattern to Figure 3(a), suggesting
the search engine is successful at identifying sensitive topics even in the case of an anonymous user.
Table XIII shows the corresponding measured rates for sensitive/non-sensitive topic detection,
which can be compared to Table VIII. Table XIV shows the detection rate for individual topics,
which can be compared to Table IX. It can be seen that the detection rates are similar to the results
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Table XIV: Measured detection rate of search engine learning of individual sensitive topics for an
anonymous user.
(a) Bing
Reference Topic
anorexia bankrupt diabetes disabled divorce gambling gay location payday prostate unemployed
True Detect 100% 95% 100% 98% 100% 100% 96% 100% 100% 98% 100%
True Other 100% 83% 86% 86% 100% 100% 100% 75% 100% 100% 100%
False Detect 0% 17% 14% 14% 0% 0% 0% 25% 0% 0% 0%
False Other 0% 5% 0% 2% 0% 0% 4% 1% 0% 2% 0%
(b) Google
Reference Topic
anorexia bankrupt diabetes disabled divorce gambling gay location payday prostate unemployed
True Detect 97% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
True Other 100% 100% 92% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
False Detect 4% 0% 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
False Other 3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
presented previously for logged-in users. In particular the True Detection rate for individual topics
is high e.g. 97−100% for Google.
We conclude that anonymity seems to provide little protection within an individual query session.
The results of Section 6.5 show that the users previous search history is not really required to infer
the topic of a sessions, the session itself is enough.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
With ε-indistinguishability as a practical model for detection of user privacy risk, we show that
this is readily implementable with available open tools that are simple to apply and provide highly
accurate results. An appealing aspect is the use of openly available resources – Bing and Google
search – a feature often missing in traditional privacy research where concerns over data disclosure
limit access to potentially sensitive test data sources.
The results in this paper suggest a number of interesting avenues for future research into how
to construct effective counter-measures to sensitive user profiling. The observations of learning
lag in Section 6.5, the observation of low, but non-zero false positives in experimental results in
Section 6, and the effect of clicking on learning in Section 6.4 appear promising for future research
into effective counter-measures.
Our current experiments focus on browser-based interaction from a personal computer. In the in-
terests of simplicity, we excluded platforms, such as mobile devices, from our current investigation.
Mobile devices represent an interesting area for further investigation. The physical size of the screen
on mobile and tablet devices increases the urgency to target adverts, while access to finer-grained
location and usage data provides even more opportunity to target recommendations.
The user-browser interaction model chosen for this paper in Section 5.2 is based on clicking on
links and subsequently navigating back to the original search page by pressing the “back” button.
The user-browser interaction model can be extended in interesting ways: by allowing the user to
spawn new browser tabs and new windows for example. We also removed cookies stored by the
search engine during sessions to ensure observations were related to individual sessions. Allowing
cookies to persist across sessions, and so potentially preserve learning effects across sessions, is
another interesting variation of user-browser interaction that merits investigation.
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In Section 5.2 the method for selecting probe queries in this paper based on high-occurrence
terms is discussed. The resulting choice of probe queries in Section 5.2 is dependent on the choice of
topics. A different choice of topics may necessitate a different choice of probe query. The approach
taken in Section 5.2 is to select keywords with the highest term frequency across result pages. It is
possible that other combinations of keywords may generate more informative probes, allowing more
sensitive detection of search engine adaptation. How to select the most effective and informative
probe queries, aligned with an individual user’s choice of topics, in a way that is not overly onerous
for a user is a subject for future research.
In this paper, training set data was derived by selecting subsets of test data and deriving a dictio-
nary of terms D. In a practical implementation, a predefined dictionary containing words appearing
in adverts can be substituted for D. Frequency data for terms can then be learned either in batch
mode from a pre-labelled set of example adverts, or in online mode by user labelling with new
terms being added to the dictionary of terms as they are encountered. In a practical implementation
some degree of online learning is desirable as adverts change over time. For example, comparison
of data gathered over six month intervals indicates that as much as 30% of terms used in adverts
may change over that period of time.
In this paper, our goal is to inform the user by detecting evidence of privacy disclosure. In this way
we hope to raise individual awareness of privacy concerns from online personalisation. A natural
next step for future research is to ask what actions an individual can take to assert control in the face
of privacy concerns? The varying and contextual nature of individual privacy concerns, explored in
[boyd 2011], [Panjwani et al. 2013] and [Agarwal et al. 2013], suggests that this is a challenge for
future research.
We view this paper as a starting point towards practical user privacy in the face of ever-
evolving and more powerful online systems. Future avenues of research include: looking beyond
search engines to other recommender systems where content types other than adverts may pro-
vide better content for adaptation detection in the case of other recommender systems; extending
ε-indistinguishability to incorporate more complex user interaction models; constructing effective
user privacy defences by exploiting observations of topic similarity and confusion encountered in
our experiments, and, investigating how PRI performs for different models of contextual advert
selection such as semantic or sense-based techniques that employ non-keyword based selection
techniques to select adverts. In conclusion, our results indicate that evidence of adaptation is easy
to find. Indeed it is mandated to maximise shareholder value. This suggests that there is an “Ele-
phant in the Room” for privacy in the face of sophisticated of modern commercial internet systems.
Namely, focusing on personal de-identification is to risk missing the larger threat of distinguisha-
bility. Our observation that such sensitive topic profiling persists even for anonymous users helps to
further underline the nature of the privacy threat.
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